Component Parts Doctrine Defense Continues To Solidify Recent California appellate court decisions have affirmed that component
parts manufacturers cannot be successfully sued in this state for strict products liability simply because a finished product incorporates their component. For example, in Walton v. William Powell Company, 183 Cal.App. 4th 1470
(April 22, 2010), the Second District Court of Appeal held that a manufacturer of valves used in a Navy carrier's propulsion system could not be held strictly liable for failure to warn or design defect caused by asbestos-containing parts used in
the propulsion system where the injury-producing components of the system were not linked in the stream of commerce with the defendant component part manufacturer. The Court reasoned that a non-defective component part in an
injury-causing shipboard propulsion or heating system was not, by itself, sufficient to trigger a duty to warn. Instead, the plaintiff must show that the component part manufacturer participated in the integration of the component into the design of the system. “[F]oreseeability alone does not warrant imposition of strict liability when … the upshot of the imposition would be to require the component manufacturer to retain ‘an expert in every finished product manufacturer’s line of
business and second-guess the finished product manufacturer whenever any of its employees received any information about any potential problem,” the court said.

In Flores v. Kaman Industrial Technologies Corp., 2010 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 3454 (May 12, 2010), the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued an unpublished decision, affirming summary judgment in favor of a defendant component part manufacturer that had been sued for injuries sustained by a plaintiff using a conveyor belt system. Kaman supplied the motor and gearbox for the system, but plaintiff’s hand was not caught in either of those components. Kaman did not participate in the design or assembly of the conveyor belt system. Further, there was no showing that Kaman’s component part was defective. The court found that plaintiff failed to successfully counter Kaman’s showing that plaintiff could not establish essential elements of his causes of action.

California Supreme Court Grants Review of Collateral Source Rule
Affecting Medical Damages in Tort Cases
Briefs are currently being filed in the California Supreme Court to seek a final opinion on whether full charges for medical expenses should be payable to tort plaintiffs as damages even where those expenses have been partially paid by an
insurer or written off by a provider.
In Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (S179115), the Fourth
Appellate District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s order that reduced a
jury’s award of medical expenses to a plaintiff to the amounts actually collected by
her medical providers, rather than permitting an award of an amount that was not
expended for her medical services. In doing so, the Court of Appeal rejected and
distinguished existing California authority, including Hanif v. Housing Authority
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635 and Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298. Instead, it concluded that the amount of medical
expenses written off by plaintiff’s medical providers should be awarded to her
under the “collateral source rule.” The collateral source rule applies when an
injured party obtains payment for its medical expenses even if the injured party
has already been compensated for these expenses by an independent source (i.e.
an insurer). The Supreme Court granted review in March to determine, among
other issues, whether the plaintiff’s economic damages should be limited to the
amount the medical provider accepts as payment. Hamilton Meats filed its opening
brief in April, and Howell’s brief is expected to be filed in June.
Supreme Court Adopts "Nerve Center" Test for
Corporate Jurisdiction
Resolving a split between the Circuits, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently held that a corporation's "principal
place of business" for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction is where its officers direct, control and
coordinate the corporation's activities – typically where its
corporate headquarters are located. In so doing, the
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial business
activity” test in favor of the "nerve center" test. Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181; 175 L. Ed. 2d 1029 (Feb. 23,
2010.)
Heightened Pleading Standard Being Applied
Trial courts throughout California are applying the
heightened factual pleading standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) to dismiss conclusory, nonspecific
tort allegations by plaintiffs:
? Southern District Dismisses Vitamin Class Action
Complaint
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California dismissed a class action complaint accusing
Bayer Corp. of misrepresenting the cancer-preventing
nature of its men's vitamin products.
Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of all
persons in the United States or, alternatively, all California
residents, who since 2005 purchased the men's health
vitamin products, alleging violations of California’s Unfair
Competition Law (CUCL), Business & Professions Code
§ 17200; Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and
Civil Code § 1750.
Defendants moved to strike allegations in the
Complaint that it claimed violated Plaintiff’s duty under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 to conduct a reasonable factual
investigation. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to
strike, and then dismissed the Complaint, without
prejudice, after finding it failed to meet the standard of
factual pleading required by Iqbal and Twombly.
Providing guidance for Plaintiff on any further
amendments, the Court noted that Plaintiff cannot expand
the scope of his claims to include a product he did not
purchase or advertisements relating to a product that he
did not rely upon. The statutory standing requirements of
the UCL and CLRA are narrowly prescribed and do not
permit such generalized allegations. Plaintiff amended and
another motion to dismiss the amended complaint is
currently before the Court. Johns v. Bayer Corp. et
al.,3:09-cv-01935 DMS(JMA) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).
? It’s Not Butter
Similarly, in Rosen v. Unilever United States, Inc.,
2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 43797 (May 3, 2010), the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California
dismissed an action alleging Unilever's advertising claim
that "I Can't Believe It's Not Butter" is "made with a blend
of nutritious oils" was untrue because the spread is made
with partially hydrogenated oil, which it alleged has
"widespread and debilitating" risks, such as coronary
diseases, heart attacks, and even death. Unilever moved
to dismiss, claiming that Rosen's Complaint was an attack
on "nonactionable sales pitches" in the company’s
advertising. The court determined that the Complaint
failed to meet the Twombly and heightened pleading
standards, noting that "the court concludes that the
illogical relationships Plaintiff draws between the nature of
partially hydrogenated oil and the representations
Defendant makes about the blend of oils renders Plaintiff's
complaint implausible on its face."
No Post-Sale Duty To Warn
In a wrongful death action against the manufacturer of
a propane heater, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court’s entry of judgment for a
defendant manufacturer on the grounds that there was no
post-sale duty to warn of an already accounted for danger.
Plaintiff initiated the action on behalf of her husband
and her father, who both died of carbon monoxide
poisoning after using a Coleman heater inside a 25- foot
camper during a hunting trip. Plaintiff argued that
consumer claims of carbon monoxide poisoning from
operating other Coleman model propane heaters in
enclosed spaces gave Coleman a post-sale duty to warn
of this risk for the product used by Plaintiff’s family. The
Ninth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not present evidence
of a new and distinct danger which arose after the heater
was originally sold. The danger of carbon monoxide
poisoning was known to Coleman before the sale, and the
heater was sold with warnings that, if followed, would
prevent carbon monoxide poisoning. As such there was
no post-sale duty to warn of a danger that was already
accounted for in warnings given at the time of sale. Daniel
v. Coleman 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6289 (9th Cir.)